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Synergy between Pollution and Carbon Emissions Control: 
Comparing China and the U.S. 
Kyung-Min Nam*†, Caleb J. Waugh*, Sergey Paltsev*, 
John M. Reilly*, and Valerie J. Karplus* 
Abstract 
We estimate the potential synergy between pollution and climate control in the U.S. and China, 
summarizing the results as emissions cross-elasticities of control. We set a range of NOx and SO2 targets, 
and record the ancillary reduction in CO2 to calculate the percentage change in CO2 divided by the 
percentage change in NOx (SO2) denoted as 𝜀CO2,NOx (𝜀CO2,SO2). Then we conduct the opposite experiment, 
setting targets for CO2 and recording the ancillary reduction in NOx and SO2 to compute 𝜀NOx,CO2 
and 𝜀SO2,CO2. For 𝜀CO2,NOx and 𝜀CO2,SO2 we find low values (0.06‒0.23) in both countries with small (10%) 
reduction targets that rise to 0.40‒0.67 in the U.S. and 0.83‒1.03 in China when targets are more stringent 
(75% reduction). This pattern reflects the availability of pollution control to target individual pollutants 
for smaller reductions but the need for wholesale change toward non-fossil technologies when large 
reductions are required. We trace the especially high cross elasticities in China to its higher dependence 
on coal. These results are promising in that China may have more incentive to greatly reduce SO2 and NOx 
with readily apparent pollution benefits in China, that at the same time would significantly reduce CO2 
emissions. The majority of existing studies have focused on the effect of CO2 abatement on other pollutants, 
typically finding strong cross effects. We find similar strong effects but with less dependence on the 
stringency of control, and stronger effects in the U.S. than in China. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
In this study, we explore synergistic effects of controlling emissions of nitrogen oxides (NOx) 
and sulfur dioxide (SO2) and of carbon dioxide (CO2) in the U.S. and China—the world’s largest 
carbon emitters. The primary motivation for this research comes from the fact that NOx and SO2, 
two conventional air pollutants, and CO2, a primary greenhouse gas (GHG), are co-generated 
from combustion of fossil fuels, so their emissions are closely linked (Agee et al., 2012). The 
close link of emissions, in turn, suggests potential synergy between two different policies—
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pollution abatement and carbon mitigation policies (Nam et al., 2013). Carbon-mitigation policy 
may achieve substantial ancillary reductions in NOx and SO2 emissions, and control of the two 
air pollutants may lead to a substantial ancillary cutback in carbon emissions. 
We are particularly interested in the following two questions: what potential synergy exists 
between pollution and carbon policies in the two countries; and whether the magnitude of the 
synergy changes over time or depends on the stringency of emissions control. While a variety of 
studies have looked at the effect of carbon targets on other pollutants, our interest is to directly 
compare the U.S. and China using comparable methods and metrics and to examine whether and 
how this relationship changes with the stringency of mitigation effort. Fewer empirical studies 
explore the carbon-mitigation effects of pollution abatement. Given the difficulties of reaching 
international agreement on CO2, this direction of effect may be more relevant. That is, countries 
may be more apt to undertake efforts to control conventional pollutants because the benefits of 
abatement are felt more directly in the country undertaking control, and these efforts may have 
indirect benefits in reduced carbon pollution.  
2. SYNERGY BETWEEN POLLUTION CONTROL AND CLIMATE POLICY 
Numerous studies explore air-quality co-benefits of climate mitigation, by recognizing that 
conventional air pollutants and GHGs are co-generated by fossil-fuel combustion (Smith, 2013). 
In most cases, ancillary benefits from GHG control are estimated to be substantially large, 
though central estimates from different studies show a fairly high standard deviation. For 
example, 10 selected national co-benefits studies, placing emphasis on health benefits from 
unintended air-quality improvement, present a co-benefits range of $2 to $128 (2008 US$) per 
ton of CO2 emissions mitigated (Nemet et al., 2010). In general, co-benefits estimates for 
developing countries tend to be larger than those for developed countries. From the review of 37 
peer-reviewed studies, for example, Nemet et al. (2010) draw the mean and median co-benefits 
of $44/tCO2 and $31/tCO2, respectively, for the developed world and those of $81/tCO2 and 
$43/tCO2 for developing countries. However, cross-country comparisons of this kind suffer from 
differences in measures of co-benefits and methods to evaluate them, often considering different 
sets of air pollutants and GHGs (Bollen et al., 2009). Apparent cross-country differences may 
result from different modeling approaches, pollutants considered, valuation methods, or other 
uncontrolled differences. 
Many co-benefits studies have been motivated to convince the global community that carbon 
emissions control is less costly than conventionally estimated. The central logic behind this 
argument is that GHG-reduction policy carries not only long-term benefits from mitigated 
climate change but also short-term benefits associated with air-quality improvement from the 
policy-led, reduced-use of fossil energy. However, a large part of the developing world is still 
skeptical about potential benefits from climate control, taking a conservative attitude toward 
legally binding GHG mitigation targets (Bodansky, 2010). In this situation, conventional 
pollution control may be more compelling to developing countries than policies targeting GHG 
mitigation directly, given that many of them confront imminent pressure to reduce local air 
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pollution. Yet, these efforts may result in carbon reductions as an indirect or ancillary effect. 
In contrast to the literature on the air-quality co-benefits of carbon reductions, the literature on 
the reverse—ancillary carbon benefits from pollution control—is sparse (Morgenstern et al., 
2004; Nam et al., 2013; Xu and Masui, 2009). We have found only six studies exploring the 
latter topic (Table 1). Three of them focus on a particular city or a sector and the others are 
China’s national-level studies without a specific sectoral focus. Despite differences in terms of 
focus and method, all these studies found substantial carbon-mitigation effects of pollution 
control, presenting the emissions cross-elasticity of 0.14‒0.99. We attempt to generalize these 
findings and compare the U.S. and China.  
Table 1. Studies of ancillary carbon-mitigation benefits from pollution control. 
Study 
 
City or 
Country 
Sectors Pollutants Policy 
Considered 
Ancillary CO2 Benefits  
(%ΔCO2/%ΔPollution) 
Morgenstern et al. 
(2004) 
Taiyuan 
(China) 
Electric SO2 Shut down small 
boilers, switch to 
low sulfur fuels 
0.76‒0.97 
Xu and Masui 
(2009) 
China All SO2 Emission caps, 
energy efficiency, 
sulfur tax 
0.90‒0.97 
Chae (2010) Seoul 
(Korea) 
Transportation 
(public buses) 
NOx, PM10 Switch to low 
sulfur fuels  
0.14‒0.88 
Agee et al. (2012) U.S. Electric NOx, SO2 Cap and trade n/a 
Cao et al. (2012) China All SO2 Emission caps 0.23 
Nam et al. (2013) China All NOx, SO2 Emission caps 0.41‒0.99 
3. CURRENT REGULATIONS IN THE U.S. AND CHINA 
In this section, we briefly review current NOx, SO2, and CO2 regulations in the U.S. and 
China. In both countries, there is evidence of environmental damages from current pollution 
levels. These have been estimated at around 4‒7% of gross domestic product in China (World 
Bank and China SEPA, 2007). In the United States the impacts of degraded air quality have been 
the subject of numerous studies (e.g., Chay and Greenstone, 2003).  
3.1 NOx and SO2 Emissions Control 
Both the U.S. and China regulate air pollutant emissions, including both NOx and SO2. 
China’s first controls on air pollution were embodied in the Air Pollution Prevention and Control 
Law China of 1987. Since then, China has regulated air pollution as part of its comprehensive 
national economic planning, which is set forth and updated through Five-Year Plans. The most 
recent is the Twelfth Five-Year Plan (FYP12) for the period of 2011‒2015, which separately 
regulates emissions from the electric power sector and mobile sources. For the electric power 
sector, it calls for a reduction of 8% in SO2 and of 10% in NOx (which was regulated under the 
FYP12 for the first time) (Li, 2011). Longer term, China’s stated goal is for ambient air quality 
in all Chinese cities to attain the National Ambient Air Quality Standards and similar guidelines 
implemented by the World Health Organization. Targets for reducing pollutant emissions include 
60% for SO2, 40% for NOx, 50% for PM10, and 40% for VOCs, relative to 2005 (Wang and Hao, 
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2012). Efficient and cleaner use of coal and the improvement of vehicle fuel quality are major 
targets of regulatory efforts. Regulators have also articulated that air quality measures should be 
harmonized with climate policies. Many climate policy instruments, such as a carbon tax, are 
considered on the basis of any “green” co-benefits (Tian, 2012). 
The U.S. has regulated air pollution from stationary and mobile sources under the Clean Air 
Act, which was first passed in 1970 and last amended in 1990 (EPA, 2013). Pollution sources are 
required to implement Maximum Achievable Control Technologies for each polluting activity, 
which are defined by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and revisited every eight 
years. In principle, implementation of control technologies is expected to support the 
achievement of air quality targets, which are set forth by the EPA’s National Ambient Air 
Quality Standards. These standards set acceptable limits for ambient levels of six “criteria” 
pollutants: carbon monoxide, lead, nitrogen dioxide, ozone, particulate matter, and sulfur 
dioxide. Areas across the U.S. are classified in terms of whether they do or do not meet the 
standards (attainment or non-attainment areas).  
3.2 CO2 Emissions Control 
In both the U.S. and China there is growing recognition of the need to control GHG 
emissions, although neither country has adopted controls on the absolute level of such emissions. 
China has currently pledged to reduce its carbon intensity by 40% in 2020, relative to its 2005 
level, as part of its commitment at the Copenhagen climate negotiations in 2009 (NRDC, 2009). 
As part of the country’s FYP12, leaders are targeting a 17% reduction in national carbon 
intensity, the first explicit target assigned for carbon in national law and designed to be 
consistent with the country’s Copenhagen commitment. The U.S. committed to reducing carbon 
emission by 17% below the 2005 levels by 2020 and suggested a goal of achieving an 83% 
reduction by 2050, although no legislation has yet been passed into law (NRDC, 2009). 
Meanwhile the growing availability of inexpensive, domestically-produced natural gas has 
displaced coal in the power sector and led to a reduction in total U.S. CO2 emissions in recent 
years (NPR, 2012; Paltsev et al., 2011). 
4. METHOD 
To explore our research questions, we have extended the MIT Emissions Prediction and 
Policy Analysis (EPPA5) model. EPPA5 is a recursive-dynamic computable general equilibrium 
(CGE) model built on the Global Trade Analysis Project version 7 (GTAP7) database 
(Narayanan and Walmsley, 2008), and has 16 global regions and 14 production sectors.1 As the 
standard version of EPPA5 already includes a CO2 abatement module, our modeling work for 
this study focuses on developing a comparable structure for NOx and SO2. Below we briefly 
introduce the CO2 abatement structure of EPPA5 and the pollution abatement structure of the 
extended model, which is described in detail by Nam et al. (2012).  
                                                 
1 Refer to Paltsev et al. (2005) for further methodological details. 
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4.1 CO2 Abatement Structure in EPPA5 
EPPA5 supposes three primary channels of CO2 emissions: fossil-fuel burning, cement 
production, and deforestation and biomass burning. Among them, CO2 emissions from the 
combustion of a fossil energy (XE) are proportional to the total amount of that energy source used 
for production (XF). We consider three kinds of fossil energy—coal, refined oil, and natural 
gas—and each of them has a constant CO2 emission factor with regard to a unit of heat energy 
that it generates. If a CO2 emissions cap is imposed under this structure, economic agents within 
the economy can switch to less CO2-intensive fossil energy sources or electricity (ELEC) or to 
substitute capital (or labor) for energy inputs—i.e. adoption of less carbon-intensive technology. 
Carbon capture and storage (CCS), which is the main carbon-abatement technology considered 
in the model, comes into play when increased prices of conventional energy inputs under policy 
constraints justify sizable capital investment for its adoption. CCS is modeled to abate not only 
CO2 but also NOx and SO2 emissions, as implementation of standard post-combustion CCS 
technology with an up to 90% CO2 capture capability requires an additional desulfurization 
process prior to carbon capture, which removes over 99% of NOx and SO2 emissions from the 
flue gas (Deutch and Moniz, 2007). In the case of non-fuel-related emissions—i.e., emissions 
from cement production, and deforestation and biomass burning—CO2 emissions are considered 
as direct inputs to production, which are not substitutable. Accordingly, the lower level of CO2 
allowances under the CO2 emissions constraint will reduce outputs from the agricultural sector 
(AGRI) and the cement-production sector, which is aggregated under the energy-intensive 
industry (EINT) in EPPA5.2 Figure 1 briefly illustrates the model’s CO2 emissions structure, 
explained above.  
                                                 
2 EINT includes the sectors that produce paper products, chemical products, ferrous and non-ferrous metals, metal 
products, and mineral products. 
 
Figure 1. CO2 emissions structure in EPPA5: (a) Fuel-related CO2 emissions, (b) Non-fuel-
related CO2 emissions, AGRI and EINT sectors only. Source: Modified from Paltsev et 
al. (2005), p. 18. 
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4.2 Pollution Abatement Structure in the Extended EPPA5 
We consider fuel-related and non-fuel-related pollution separately (Figure 2). On the one 
hand, each fuel bundle of the extended model has a fuel-related pollution sub-nest, so that fuel 
(XF), precursor emissions (XE), and pollution abatement (XA) are considered as direct production 
inputs. Under the Leontief production structure, each sector requires XF in a fixed proportion of 
its total output and each unit of XF begets a unit of XE. We then adopt a constant elasticity of 
substitution (CES) production structure with the elasticity (𝜎𝐹𝑢𝑒𝑙) between XE and XA. As XA is 
the capital cost of a unit of abatement, increasing XA requires additional capital, competing for 
investment with other capital demands. We estimate 𝜎𝐹𝑢𝑒𝑙 from the technology cost and 
emissions data generated by the baseline scenario of the Greenhouse Gas and Air Pollution 
Interactions and Synergies (GAINS) model (Nguyen et al., 2011). 
 
Figure 2. Pollution abatement structure: (a) Fuel-related pollution, (b) Non-fuel-related 
pollution. Source: Adopted from Nam et al. (2013). 
Absent policy, pollution of XP is emitted from each activity. With policy, the level of 
abatement (XA) is determined by the stringency of pollution control and cost of abatement. In 
other words, emitting under pollution control creates an incentive to abate until the marginal 
price for abating equals the marginal price for emitting. As emitting and abating become overly 
costly, economic agents will shift toward less pollution-intensive fuels or reduce energy 
consumption to meet emissions constraints.  
Non-fuel-related pollution is represented as a production input, which can be substituted by 
other conventional inputs, and associated pollution-abatement decisions are determined by 
𝜎𝑃𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑢𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑡. In this structure, adoption of abatement inputs results in a proportionally increased 
use of all other inputs, given all other prices unchanged. As NOx and SO2 cases are solved 
separately by sector and by fuel, the initial levels of pollution emissions and marginal abatement 
costs are unique to the fuel source, sector, and pollutant. 
5. RESULTS 
We simulate the model developed above by imposing progressively tighter levels of nationwide 
emissions caps. The concept of an emissions cross-elasticity is used to summarize the ancillary 
reductions in the non-target emissions, i, resulting from a policy that targets reductions in 
(a) (b)Fuel-Emission Bundle
Pollutant
Domestic Output
Conventional Inputs
Value-added
Labor Capital
Resource-intensive Bundle
…
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pollutant emission j. As shown below, the emissions cross-elasticity (𝜀𝑖,𝑗) is calculated as the 
percentage change in emissions of i between the reference (REF) and policy (POL) scenarios 
divided by the percentage change in emissions of j. 
𝜀𝑖,𝑗 =
𝑋𝑖
𝑅𝐸𝐹 − 𝑋𝑖
𝑃𝑂𝐿
𝑋𝑗
𝑅𝐸𝐹 − 𝑋𝑗
𝑃𝑂𝐿 ∙
𝑋𝑗
𝑅𝐸𝐹
𝑋𝑖
𝑅𝐸𝐹 
This is a simple arc elasticity comparing the total change from stringent policies with the 
reference pollution level. We first examine the ancillary benefits of carbon emissions reductions 
from SO2 and NOx policies (𝜀CO2,SO2 and 𝜀CO2,NOx) and then the reverse (𝜀NOx,CO2 and 𝜀SO2,CO2). 
5.1 Ancillary Carbon Benefits of SO2 and NOx Control 
We simulate a total of five scenarios. One is a baseline scenario, which we call REF. In this 
scenario, we do not impose any further policy constraint beyond existing NOx and SO2 emissions 
regulations. The other four are policy scenarios imposing progressively tighter reduction targets 
for NOx and SO2 emissions at the national level. We simulate these reductions over the period of 
2015‒2050. The scenarios cap emissions at 10%, 25%, 50%, or 75% reductions from the 
baseline NOx and SO2 emissions levels. The EPPA model solves every 5 years, and we compute 
the cross-elasticities for each reduction level and for each solution year. This setup allows us to 
evaluate (1) how ancillary carbon benefits differ for SO2 and NOx control, (2) how they vary 
over time, and (3) how they change as the stringency of control efforts varies. We set the policy 
targets relative to the reference emissions levels, instead of imposing constant emissions caps, so 
that we have comparable reductions in China and the U.S. Emissions of all pollutants are 
growing rapidly in China and slowly in the U.S., and hence an absolute cap relative to a historic 
year would imply much greater percentage reductions in China over time than in the U.S., 
conflating any time trend with changes in the stringency of reduction.  
Our results present several common tendencies in each country (Tables 2 and 3). First, 
𝜀CO2,NOx and 𝜀CO2,SO2 are comparable, in terms of magnitude, although the former tend to be 
slightly higher than the latter. 𝜀CO2,NOx shows ranges of 0.12‒0.67 in the U.S. and 0.06‒1.03 in 
China; similarly, 𝜀CO2,SO2 shows ranges of 0.11‒0.54 in the U.S. and 0.08‒0.93 in China. This 
outcome is primarily because NOx and SO2 emissions share similar sources, such as fossil-fuel 
combustion or energy-intensive production. Both 𝜀CO2,NOx and 𝜀CO2,SO2 tend to be greater under 
more stringent pollution-control targets. Under the 10% NOx reduction targets, for example, 
𝜀CO2,NOx shows ranges of 0.12‒0.23 in the U.S. and of 0.06‒0.13 in China, but the 75% targets 
drive up the ranges to 0.59‒0.61 for the U.S. and 0.94‒1.03 for China. This coincides with our 
expectation, as stringent pollution-control targets make pollution-abatement options costly and 
increase the need for cutting energy use—particularly, fossil fuel use.  
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Table 2. Cross-elasticity (𝜺CO2,NOx) when only NOx emissions caps are imposed. 
 U.S. China 
 10% 25% 50% 75% 10% 25% 50% 75% 
2015 0.12 0.21 0.44 0.59 0.13 0.37 0.73 0.94 
2020 0.15 0.25 0.48 0.62 0.12 0.36 0.74 0.94 
2025 0.18 0.28 0.52 0.67 0.11 0.35 0.69 0.97 
2030 0.19 0.30 0.61 0.61 0.10 0.33 0.64 0.98 
2035 0.21 0.32 0.65 0.61 0.09 0.30 0.58 0.99 
2040 0.22 0.33 0.67 0.61 0.08 0.28 0.52 1.02 
2045 0.23 0.34 0.63 0.61 0.07 0.25 0.47 1.03 
2050 0.23 0.34 0.60 0.61 0.06 0.22 0.42 1.03 
Table 3. Cross-elasticity (𝜺CO2,SO2) when only SO2 emissions caps are imposed. 
 U.S. China 
 10% 25% 50% 75% 10% 25% 50% 75% 
2015 0.11 0.29 0.34 0.44 0.10 0.33 0.66 0.83 
2020 0.13 0.25 0.35 0.47 0.11 0.34 0.63 0.84 
2025 0.15 0.33 0.35 0.47 0.11 0.35 0.60 0.87 
2030 0.15 0.35 0.39 0.40 0.11 0.35 0.59 0.89 
2035 0.14 0.37 0.39 0.40 0.10 0.33 0.54 0.90 
2040 0.13 0.39 0.50 0.40 0.10 0.31 0.49 0.92 
2045 0.12 0.33 0.48 0.40 0.09 0.28 0.45 0.93 
2050 0.11 0.35 0.54 0.40 0.08 0.24 0.41 0.92 
 
While the general relationships are similar across countries, China tends to show higher 
𝜀CO2,NOx and 𝜀CO2,SO2 than the U.S. under stringent targets. Under the 75% targets, for example, 
𝜀CO2,SO2 in China shows a range of 0.83‒0.93, roughly twice as high as that in the U.S. (0.40‒
0.47). This contrasts the 10% target case, where 𝜀CO2,SO2 is slightly higher in the U.S. (0.11‒0.15) 
than in China (0.08‒0.11). As will be explained in detail, this fact is closely related to China’s 
higher dependency on coal. The time trend of the elasticities in each emission control scenario 
also differs by country. In brief, both 𝜀CO2,NOx and 𝜀CO2,SO2 in China present declining tendencies 
over time, while those in the U.S. show increasing or constant trends. This is primarily because 
NOx and SO2 baseline emissions, which continue to grow over time in China, allow China to 
have more room to comply with the given policy without reducing energy use in later time 
periods. In contrast, NOx and SO2 baseline emissions in the U.S. grow only marginally over time, 
leading to relatively constant cross effects over time.   
Each simulation run for the results introduced above constrains either NOx or SO2, but in 
reality, China is likely to regulate the two pollutants at the same time. Thus, we developed a new 
set of policy simulations where limits are set on both pollutants, and this case is denoted as 
POLL. The elasticity denoted as 𝜀CO2,POLL refers to the percentage change of CO2 emissions 
driven by a unit percent change of NOx and SO2 emissions due to targeting reductions in both 
pollutants together.  
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As illustrated in Figure 3, 𝜀CO2,POLL presents trends similar to those of 𝜀CO2,NOx and 𝜀CO2,SO2. 
The stringency of the policy shock is positively associated with the elasticity in each country, 
and China tends to show substantially higher 𝜀CO2,POLL than the U.S. when targets are stringent. 
 
Figure 3. Cross emissions elasticity (𝜺CO2,POLL) by scenario: (a) U.S., (b) China. 
However, two puzzling aspects are found in the same figure. One is why in the U.S. 𝜀CO2,POLL 
presents lower values under the 75% reduction targets than the 50% case in 2030 and thereafter. 
As hinted earlier, the answer is closely related to the changed mix of energy demand in the 
presence of policy shocks. Due to its high emission factors, coal is affected more greatly by NOx 
and SO2 regulations than other fossil energy sources. We see an increasing role of other energy 
sources in meeting the given emissions-reduction targets, as energy demand from coal converges 
to the minimal level that an economy can afford (Figure 4). Under the 75% targets, for example, 
the U.S. is expected to remove over 98% of its baseline coal use by 2025 and to comply with the 
policy by cutting an increased portion of energy demand from refined oil and natural gas since 
then (Figure 5). The reduced role of coal and the expanded role of refined oil and natural gas in 
policy compliance cases lowers cross-elasticities of SO2 and NOx control, leading to the 
relatively sharp decline of 𝜀CO2,POLL in 2030, even below the 50% target level. The 50% 𝜀CO2,POLL 
line for the U.S. suddenly rises in 2030 because a large cut in coal use in the electricity sector is 
achieved through increased substitution of the natural gas combined cycle (NGCC) for 
conventional coal-fired power-generation technology (Figure 6).   
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Figure 4. Reduced demand for primary energy inputs under selected policy scenarios: (a) 
U.S.: 10%, (b) U.S.: 75%, (c) China: 10%, (d) China: 75%. 
 
Figure 5. Demand for coal under policy scenarios: (a) U.S., (b) China. 
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Figure 6. Electricity output mix in the U.S. under pollution-abatement policy: (a) REF, (b) 
10% targets, (c) 25% targets, (d) 50% targets, (e) 75% targets. 
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to cut its coal use under the 75% targets, as shown in Figure 5b, and thus presents an increasing 
trend of 𝜀CO2,POLL over time. 
5.2 Ancillary Air Quality Benefits of CO2 Mitigation 
We also simulated a reference and four climate policy scenarios for a cross-country 
comparison of ancillary NOx and SO2 reductions from carbon mitigation. We set a range of CO2 
reduction targets—10%, 25%, 50%, or 75% reductions from the reference level—and recorded 
ancillary NOx and SO2 reductions to compute emissions cross-elasticities. 
In general, 𝜀NOx,CO2 and 𝜀SO2,CO2 tend to be much higher than 𝜀CO2,NOx and 𝜀CO2,SO2 at low levels 
of abatement, but increase more gradually with the level of abatement (Tables 4 and 5). For 
example, 𝜀NOx,CO2 shows ranges of 0.43‒0.78 in the U.S. and 0.29‒0.45 in China under the 10% 
reduction targets. The ranges go up to 0.60‒0.85 and 0.41‒0.65, respectively, under the 75% 
targets. This result can be attributed to the increased stringency of a policy shock leaving little 
room for fuel switching, placing a greater pressure for energy demand reduction on an economy. 
In both countries, 𝜀SO2,CO2 presents slightly higher values than 𝜀NOx,CO2.  
Table 4. Cross-elasticity between NOx and CO2 (𝜺NOx,CO2). 
 U.S. China 
 10% 25% 50% 75% 10% 25% 50% 75% 
2015 0.78 0.79 0.82 0.85 0.45 0.49 0.55 0.65 
2020 0.68 0.73 0.73 0.77 0.40 0.45 0.51 0.61 
2025 0.60 0.67 0.68 0.72 0.37 0.42 0.49 0.55 
2030 0.54 0.61 0.70 0.68 0.35 0.39 0.47 0.53 
2035 0.49 0.56 0.68 0.65 0.33 0.37 0.45 0.50 
2040 0.47 0.51 0.66 0.63 0.32 0.36 0.41 0.45 
2045 0.45 0.52 0.64 0.61 0.31 0.35 0.39 0.43 
2050 0.43 0.48 0.61 0.60 0.29 0.33 0.37 0.41 
Table 5. Cross-elasticity between SO2 and CO2 (𝜺SO2,CO2). 
 U.S. China 
 10% 25% 50% 75% 10% 25% 50% 75% 
2015 1.21 1.13 1.10 1.02 0.61 0.64 0.67 0.74 
2020 1.10 1.17 1.05 0.97 0.54 0.57 0.61 0.70 
2025 0.99 1.12 1.15 0.95 0.48 0.53 0.58 0.65 
2030 0.91 1.03 1.30 0.92 0.44 0.48 0.55 0.62 
2035 0.84 0.92 1.27 0.90 0.41 0.45 0.53 0.59 
2040 0.80 0.80 1.24 0.88 0.39 0.43 0.50 0.55 
2045 0.77 0.87 1.21 0.86 0.37 0.42 0.49 0.52 
2050 0.74 0.77 1.19 0.85 0.34 0.39 0.47 0.49 
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Both 𝜀NOx,CO2 and 𝜀SO2,CO2 are substantially higher in the U.S. than in China under all policy 
scenarios, presenting a clear contrast to 𝜀CO2,NOx and 𝜀CO2,SO2. For the given 10‒75% CO2 
reduction targets, 𝜀NOx,CO2 shows ranges of 0.43‒0.85 in the U.S. and of 0.29‒0.65 in China; 
𝜀SO2,CO2 is distributed between 0.74 and 1.30 in the U.S. and between 0.34 and 0.74 in China. The 
stronger cross effects in the U.S. are because a policy shock of comparable stringency requires 
the U.S. to cut a relatively large amount of coal use. The carbon constraint is met primarily 
through fuel switching, reduction of energy consumption, and adoption of CCS and advanced 
energy technologies. All these responses entail relatively large reductions in coal use, compared 
with other fossil energy use, due to coal’s higher carbon content. Under the 25% reduction 
targets, for example, around half the total energy-use reduction in the U.S. is from coal; the 
corresponding share for China is even higher, ranging from 64.6‒74.7%, due to China’s higher 
dependence on coal (Figure 7a and b). In relative terms, however, comparable carbon-mitigation 
targets induce more drastic cuts in coal use (from the baseline levels) in the U.S. than in China. 
Under the 25% targets, for example, the U.S. is estimated to reduce 37.6‒45.6% of its baseline 
coal consumption (8.7‒12.3 EJ), while China is estimated to reduce 28.3‒29.0% (21.4‒46.7 EJ) 
(Figure 7c). A greater magnitude of coal use reduction in the U.S., in turn, results in higher 
cross-elasticities for the U.S. 
 
Figure 7. Reduced energy use under 25% CO2 reduction scenario: (a) U.S., (b) China, (c) 
Total use of coal-based energy relative to the baseline level. 
In some cases, the cross effects deviate from the given general trends, as exemplified by 
𝜀SO2,CO2 for the U.S. As illustrated in Figure 8, a consistent relationship between cross-elasticity 
and policy stringency does not hold for the U.S., in contrast to the case of China, where the level 
of 𝜀SO2,CO2 increases as carbon reduction targets become more stringent. This result is in part 
explained by policy-driven changes in coal consumption (Figure 9). The U.S. 𝜀SO2,CO2 line for 
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the 75% target case is located below that for the 50% case because coal completely exits the 
market from the initial year of carbon constraint under the 75% targets, while demand for coal 
remains under the 50% targets until 2025. In other words, a larger share of the total energy 
demand reduction is from oil and gas under the 75% targets—thus, leading to relatively lower 
pollution-abatement effects—than under the 50% targets. In contrast, even the 75% carbon 
reduction policy does not drive coal completely out of China’s energy market, causing less 
drastic changes in the trend of cross-elasticities. Again, this is because under the reference case 
scenario China’s fossil energy use is growing relatively fast while there is limited growth in the 
U.S. 
 
Figure 8. Emissions cross-elasticity (𝜺SO2,CO2) by scenario: (a) U.S., (b) China. Graph uses 
data from Table 6. 
 
Figure 9. Reduced demand for coal-based energy: (a) U.S., (b) China. 
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But the remaining puzzle is why part of the cross-elasticities for the 75% reduction targets in 
the U.S. remain below the elasticities for the 10% and 25% targets in later periods. A focus on 
the electricity sector is helpful to understand why this happens, as it is the single most important 
production sector in complying with carbon-mitigation targets in the U.S. (Figure 10). First, the 
10% targets are not stringent enough to incentivize adoption of low carbon technology, such as 
NGCC, so the targets are met primarily through fuel switching and less use of energy (Figure 
11). The 25% targets, however, allow NGCC to penetrate the market, and its substitution for 
coal-fired power generation technology achieves a relatively large reduction of coal use, 
compared with the reduction under the 10% targets. Therefore, the cross-elasticities for the 25% 
targets tend to be higher than those for the 10% targets. Under the 50% targets, NGCC and other 
clean energy technologies, such as advanced nuclear3 and wind power with a back-up capacity 
from natural gas (wind-gas), are competitive in the market and crowd out conventional coal at a 
rapid pace. The cross-elasticities for the 50% targets are greater than those for the 10% and 25% 
targets in later periods, as the 50% targets drive conventional coal completely out of the market 
in 2030 and later periods while the 10% and 25% targets allow gradual increase of coal use.  
  
                                                 
3 Advanced nuclear refers to generation 3+ nuclear technologies based on reprocessing or breeder-type fuel cycles. 
 
Figure 10. Reduced emissions in the U.S. by gas and sector under CO2 control scenarios. 
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Finally, the 75% targets completely crowd out conventional coal-fired power-generation 
technology from 2015, allowing expanded roles of advanced nuclear and wind-gas. But 
reduction of fossil energy use in the electricity sector alone is not enough to comply with the 
policy; further energy use reduction should come from other sectors, which in general depend on 
coal less than the electricity sector does. As shown in Figure 10, the 75% targets in particular 
require increased energy demand reduction from the household sector, which mainly consumes 
refined oil and natural gas for vehicle operations and heating. Thus, the cross-elasticities are 
relatively low under the 75% targets, compared with other cases. However, the elasticities for the 
75% targets catch up with those for the 10% and 25% targets in later periods and eventually 
overtake them, as the 10% and 25% targets allow gradual increase of coal use over time while 
the 75% targets do not.  
6. CONCLUSIONS 
In this study, we first introduce an analytic framework for pollution-climate control synergy 
and then apply the methodology to the U.S. and China. The primary contributions of this study to 
 
Figure 11. Electricity output mix in the U.S. under carbon-mitigation policy: (a) REF, (b) 
10% targets, (c) 25% targets, (d) 50% targets, (e) 75% targets. 
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the literature and the policy debate include the following three aspects. First, our analysis is 
based on a new methodological approach, which endogenizes pollution emissions-abatement 
decisions within a CGE structure, incorporating bottom-up engineering details. This is a 
substantial improvement on conventional methods assuming fixed emission factors or exogenous 
abatement opportunities. Second, our study enriches the literature on ancillary carbon benefits of 
pollution abatement, which is sparse despite growing attention to the topic. Finally, our results, 
summarized as emissions cross-elasticities, provide the basis for a parallel comparison of the 
U.S. and China, in terms of ancillary CO2 reductions from NOx and SO2 targets or of ancillary 
NOx and SO2 reductions from CO2 targets. 
In general, higher stringency of pollution-abatement targets is associated with greater cross-
elasticities of pollution control. For 𝜀CO2,NOx and 𝜀CO2,SO2, we find low values (0.06‒0.23) in both 
countries with the 10% reduction targets, but they rise to 0.40‒0.67 in the U.S. and to 0.83‒1.03 
in China under the 75% targets. The key mechanism underlying this result is that increased costs 
for abatement-technology adoption and fuel switching under stringent targets incentivize 
economic agents to shift toward energy-consumption reductions and advanced energy-
technology implementation, having greater effects on carbon emissions. That is, this tendency 
reflects the availability of pollution control to target individual pollutants for smaller reductions 
but the need for wholesale change toward non-fossil technologies when large reductions are 
required. The especially high cross-elasticities in China under stringent targets are due to the 
interplay between increased pressure for energy input reduction and China’s high dependence on 
coal. Meeting stringent targets in both countries requires a massive reduction of energy use, but a 
larger share of the total energy use reduction in China is from coal. This relatively larger 
reduction of coal use leads to greater ancillary carbon reductions in China, translating into higher 
cross-elasticities.  
A similar trend is found from the opposite experiment. Both 𝜀SO2,CO2 and 𝜀NOx,CO2, in general, 
tend to increase with increased stringency of carbon reduction targets. For example, 𝜀NOx,CO2 
presents ranges of 0.43‒0.78 in the U.S. and 0.29‒0.45 in China under the 10% targets, but the 
75% targets drive up the ranges to 0.60‒0.85 and 0.41‒0.65, respectively. In some cases, 
however, the cross-elasticities in the U.S. deviate from this general trend, depending on the role 
of advanced energy technologies. In addition, both 𝜀SO2,CO2 and 𝜀NOx,CO2 are much greater in the 
U.S. than in China, presenting a clear contrast to 𝜀CO2,NOx and 𝜀CO2,SO2. The magnitude of coal use 
reductions from the baseline levels is a main source of this result. In general, meeting CO2 
reduction targets of comparable stringency leads to more drastic reduction of coal use in the U.S. 
(partly through more intensive adoption of low carbon technology), generating greater cross 
effects in the U.S. than in China. 
In sum, our results demonstrate substantial cross effects between the two conventional air 
pollutants and carbon dioxide in both directions and in both countries. The majority of existing 
studies have focused on the effect of CO2 abatement on other pollutants, typically finding strong 
cross effects, but we also found evidence for similarly strong ancillary carbon-mitigation effects 
of pollution control. The latter result, in particular, seems to offer some hope that carbon 
18 
emissions may not increase as much as some forecasts suggest if concerns about conventional 
pollutants lead to policies to reduce them. Our study of China presents a strong effect on carbon 
emissions of efforts to reduce SO2 and NOx. The U.S. and China are both relatively coal-
intensive economies. Given that other economies are less so, we may well see different 
relationships between control of conventional pollutants and CO2. It would be interesting to 
follow up this research for other regions of the world.  
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